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I. BIOGRAPHY 
 
A. Early Life 
Joan Ruth Bader, nicknamed “Kiki” was born on March 15, 1933.1  She grew up in Flatbush, 
Brooklyn, New York in a family of Jewish immigrants.2  Her father, Nathan Bader, was an 
immigrant from Russia3 who worked as a fur manufacturer, and later in a men’s clothing store.4  
Her mother, Celia Bader, was born in the United States, but originally from Poland.5  At the 
tender age of two, Justice Ginsburg became the only child of her parents after her older sister 
Marilyn died from meningitis.6  Although tragedy struck the Bader family early on in life, her 
parents continued to instill love and perseverance into Ruth as a child. 
Ruth recalls some of her greatest memories being in the company of her mother who most 
heavily influenced her life and introduced her to reading and the art of learning.7  Although her 
mother did not work outside of the house, her mother continuously stressed the importance of 
Ruth being independent and to think for herself.8  Ruth also attended P.S. 238 and James 
Madison High School in Brooklyn where she both edited and wrote for the high school 
newspaper, The Highway Herald.9  Specifically, she wrote articles on the topics of the Bill of 
Rights and the Magna Carta,10 which can be argued foreshadowed her career path and success.  
While Ruth attended high school, her mother was battling with cervical cancer, which she 
                                                                 
1 Phil Schatz, Hon. Ruth Ginsburg Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States , 57-MAY Fed. Law. 24, 25 
(2010). 
2 Id. 
3 Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9 Buff. Women’s L.J. 97, 103 
(2001). 
4 Malvina Halberstam, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: The First Jewish Woman On The United States Supreme Court , 19 
Cordozo L. Rev. 1441, 1443 (1998). 
5 Schatz, supra at 25. 
6 Id. 
7 Halberstam, supra at 1443. 
8 Id. (citation omitted). 
9 Id. at 1444. 
10 Id. 
 4 
ultimately fell victim to in June 1950, the day before Ruth’s high school graduation.11  Although 
tragedy struck the Bader household again, Ruth continued to soar and excel in school.  Ruth 
survived these heart-wrenching times by focusing on her studies.  According to Justice Ginsburg, 
“I knew that [my mother] wanted me to study hard and get good grades and succeed in life so 
that’s what I did.”12  And it is evident that Justice Ginsburg did just that. 
B. Life and Love At Cornell 
Upon graduating sixth in her class, Justice Ginsburg received copious amounts of awards 
including a New York State scholarship and other scholarships to attend Cornell.  She ultimately 
chose to attend Cornell University in 1950.13  While attending college, she also worked part-time 
clerical jobs to support herself, in addition to relying on her financial assistance scholarships.14  
She graduated with high honors and a degree in Government and was elected into Phi Beta 
Kappa.15  In her freshman year there, she met and fell in love with her future husband Martin 
(“Marty”) David Ginsburg who was a year ahead of her.16  In recalling her journey with her 
husband to Harvard Law School, Justice Ginsburg states in an interview, “[Marty] was the first 
boy I ever met who cared that I had a brain, [and] we decided that whatever we would do, we 
would both do it.”17  They wed in June 1954 soon after her graduation, and a year after Marty 
completed his first year at Harvard Law School.18 
                                                                 
11 Id.; Schatz, supra at 103. 
12 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, interview by Brian Lamb, C-SPAN, June 1, 2009. 
13 Halberstam, supra at 1444; Schatz, supra at 26. 
14 Id. at 1444. 
15 Schatz, supra at 26. 
16 Halberstam, supra at 1445. 
17 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, interview with Larry Josephson, Only in America: 350 Years of the American Jewish 
Experience (Sept. 2, 2004), available at www.onlyinamerica.info/ginsburg.shtml (accessed Nov. 13, 2014); See 
Schatz, supra at at 26. 
18 Halberstam, supra at 1445. 
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Although Justice Ginsburg had also been accepted into Harvard Law, she could not 
attend immediately because her husband was drafted into the Army.19  The young couple moved 
to Fort Sill, Oklahoma for two years.  During that time, Justice Ginsburg gave birth on July 21, 
1955 to her only daughter Jane Carol,20 who is now the “Morton L. Janklow Professor of 
Literary and Artistic Property Law at Columbia University Law School.”21  It was in Oklahoma 
that Justice Ginsburg experienced her “first bitter taste of gender based employment 
discrimination.”22  Not long after the family’s relocation, the Justice accepted a position working 
for a local Social Security office.23  Unfortunately, when she informed her superiors of her 
pregnancy, the superiors decided that she could not travel to one of the training sessions required 
for a promotion despite the fact that she was otherwise qualified for the promotion.24  As a result 
of her status as a pregnant woman, Justice Ginsburg was forced to accept a lower position and 
pay, instead of a position that she otherwise qualified for.25  
Following Marty’s two-year draft into the Army, the Ginsburg family returned to Boston 
to attend Harvard.  Since, “law school was essentially a men’s club in 1956,”26 Justice 
Ginsburg’s entering class of 500 students only consisted of nine women.27  Unfortunately, “[t]he 
pressure on the few women to prove their entitlement to attend law school was intense,”28 which 
proved to be essence of her stay at Harvard following two incidents.  Justice Ginsburg recalls the 
epitome of the academic atmosphere when she states, “You felt that every eye was on you.  
                                                                 
19 Id.; Schatz, supra at 26; Olney, supra at 104. 
20 Halberstam, supra at 1445. 
21 Schatz, supra at 26. 
22 Olney, supra at 104. 
23 Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination , 20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 699, 705 
(1998). 
24 Halberstam, supra at 1445. 
25 Olney, supra at 104. 
26 Schatz, supra at 26. 
27 Halberstam, supra at 1445. 
28 Schatz, supra at 26. 
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Every time you answered a question, you felt that you were answering for your entire sex.”29  
While attending Harvard, Justice Ginsburg was invited to attend a dinner for the nine female 
first-year students given by Dean Erwin Griswold.30  During the dinner Dean Griswold 
demanded that all of the women explain how they justified taking up admissions seats that would 
have otherwise gone to qualified men.31  Since it was common during that time for professors to 
call on women for “comic relief,”32 Justice Ginsburg responded to Dean Griswold in the least 
assertive way possible, and stated that she thought that studying law would make her a better 
wife.33  Furthermore while on Harvard’s Law Review, Justice Ginsburg came face to face with 
discrimination yet again.  A room in Harvard’s Lamont Library was closed to women, which 
made it impossible for Justice Ginsburg to have access to a periodical that she needed in order to 
complete her cite-checking assignment for the Law Review.34  Despite the many challenges Ruth 
faced she continued to excel academically. 
C. Cancer Recurrence  
 While as a member of the Harvard Law Review, and a mother of a toddler, Justice 
Ginsburg’s studies were once again interrupted.  Cancer made its entrance into Justice 
Ginsburg’s life yet again, but this time it plagued her husband Marty.  Marty was diagnosed with 
advanced testicular cancer, which left him debilitated for an entire term while in law school. 35 
During this time Ruth bore her husband’s studies on top of her own studies, and recalls that, 
                                                                 
29 Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, 
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/magazine/12ginsburg-t.html (accessed Nov. 20, 2014). 
30 Halberstam, supra at 1445. 
31 Olney, supra at 104. 
32 Halberstam, supra at 1445 (citation omitted). 
33 Olney, supra at 105 (citing David Margolick, Judge Ginsburg’s Life a Trial by Adversity, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
1993, at A1, A9). 
34 Halberstam, supra at 1445 (citation omitted); Ellington et al., supra at 705. 
35 Schatz, supra at 26. 
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“That’s when I learned to work all night.”36  Ginsburg continued to defy the odds by attending 
her husband’s classes and taking his notes on top of all of the work she had to complete for 
herself, all while ranking among the top ten students in her class at the time.37  Fortunately, 
Marty made a full recovery from his cancer and upon his graduation from Harvard Law in 1958 
he accepted employment as a tax attorney in New York.38  This was the foundation to his 
successful career as he is now deemed as one of the premier tax experts in the United States.39  
Once her husband accepted his position as a tax attorney, Justice Ginsburg transferred to 
Columbia Law School and yet again she made Law Review.  Unsurprisingly, she tied for first in 
her class as a Kent Scholar,40 and she became the first person, male or female, to make Law 
Review at two major Ivy League schools.41 
D. No Women For Hire 
 In 1959, upon graduating top in her class from Columbia Law School, “not a single law 
firm in the city of New York” would hire Justice Ginsburg.42  Her former professor at Harvard 
Law School, Albert Sacks recommended her as a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, because of her outstanding academic record.43  However, although Ginsburg was 
more than qualified to complete the job, Justice Frankfurter was not willing to hire Ruth simply 
because she was a woman.44  Justice Ginsburg explains her challenges during this era when she 
                                                                 
36 Debra Bruno, Justice Ginsburg Remembers Her First Steps in the Law , LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, 
www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1194861838591. 
37 Schatz, supra at 26; Olney, supra at 105; Halberstam, supra at 1445. 
38 Id. at 26 
39 Nina Totenberg, At The High Court, A Tribute To A ‘Chef Supreme,’ WBUR.org, Dec. 12, 2011, available at 
http://www.wbur.org/npr/143352409/at-the-high-court-a-tribute-to-a-chef-supreme?ft=3&f=143352409. 
40 Olney, supra at 105. 
41 Ellington et al., supra at 706 (citations omitted). 
42 Halberstam, supra at 1446 (citation ommitted). 
43 Id. at 1445. 
44 Id. at 1445. 
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recalls, “In the fifties, the traditional law firms were just beginning to turn around on hiring 
Jews…But to be a woman, a Jew, and a mother to boot, that combination was a bit much.”45  
Mercifully, she secured a judicial clerkship with the Honorable Edmund L. Palmieri of the 
Southern District of New York through her mentor, Gerald Gunther.46   
 Following her clerkship, Ruth declined all of her firm offers and instead worked on the 
Columbia Project on International Civil Procedure at Columbia.47  While there, she was to 
research foreign systems of civil procedure and to make suggestions to the United States rules on 
transnational litigation for improvements.48  During her duration there she also co-authored a 
book on Swedish Civil Procedure and in 1969 was awarded an honorary doctorate from the 
University of Lund.49 
E. Women’s Rights At Rutgers – Ruth At Rutgers  
 In 1963 Justice Ginsburg joined the Rutgers Law faculty in Newark, New Jersey.  It was 
one of the very few schools that were willing to accept women at that time.50  It was at Rutgers 
where Ruth initially became directly involved with women’s rights.51  It was during this time that 
she became pregnant with her son, James Ginsburg,52 who is the chief executive officer of 
Chicago’s classical record company Cedille Records,53 and gave birth in September 1965.  
Afraid that she might lose her position as a faculty member, just as she had been demoted in 
Oklahoma because of her pregnancy, Justice Ginsburg attempted to hide her pregnancy with her 
                                                                 
45 Id. at 1446 (citation omitted). 
46 Schatz, supra at 26. 
47 Halberstam, supra at 1446. 
48 Olney, supra at 106. 
49 Schatz, supra at 26. 
50 Halberstam, supra at 1446. 
51 Id. at 1447; Olney, supra at 106. 
52 Halberstam, supra at 1446. 
53 Schatz, supra at 26. 
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son by wearing loose-fitting clothes that she borrowed from her mother-in- law.54 This 
demonstrated how her experiences with discrimination influenced her actions and responses to it.   
Furthermore, while at Rutgers she became affiliated with the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) as gender discrimination cases began to surge during the late sixties.55  Many of 
the incoming gender discrimination cases were referred to her, because as she put it, “well, sex 
discrimination was regarded as a woman’s job.”56  Her success in the ACLU resulted in Justice 
Ginsburg founding and becoming a co-director of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project 
(WRP).57  It was during this time that Justice Ginsburg’s passion for fighting gender inequality 
propelled her to argue before the Supreme Court, specifically winning five of her six gender 
discrimination cases.58  This included: arguing that female lieutenants in the Air Force were 
entitled to the same housing and medical benefits as her male associates,59 that a widow is 
entitled to the same Social Security payments to support his or her son regardless of the gender 
of the widow,60 and that a state law in Missouri that made jury duty optional for women was 
discriminatory because it devalued women’s contributions to society as compared to men.61 
F. Circuit Court Judge Nomination  
 In 1980 Justice Ginsburg resigned from her general counsel position for the WRP 
following her nomination by then President Jimmy Carter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia.62  His intention was to increase the number of females in the judiciary in 
                                                                 
54 Halberstam, supra at 1446. 
55 Id. at 1447. 
56 Olney, supra at 106 (citation omitted). 
57 Id. at 107. 
58 Halberstam, supra at 1448. 
59 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
60 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
61 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
62 Olney, supra at 115. 
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addition to making merit-based appointments.63  With almost a unanimous decision by the 
Senate, Ruth Bader Ginsburg became Judge Ginsburg in 1980.  Since the Ginsburg family had 
continuously moved to accommodate Mr. Ginsburg’s employment opportunities, he did not 
hesitate to relocate for his wife’s new position.  He specifically gave up his tenured position at 
Columbia Law School and his private practice at a prominent New York City law firm to 
accompany his wife in Washington, D.C.64 According to Marty, “I have been supportive of my 
wife since the beginning of time, and she has been supportive of me.  It’s not sacrifice; it’s 
family.”65 
G. The Supreme Seat  
After nearly thirteen years in the Circuit Court, on June 14, 1993, President Clinton 
nominated Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.66  President 
Clinton nominated Ruth for the following reasons: 
First, in her years on the bench, she has genuinely distinguished herself as one of 
our nation’s best judges, progressive in outlook, wise in judgment, balanced and 
fair in her opinions. 
Second, over the course of a lifetime in her pioneering work on behalf of the women 
of this country, she has compiled a truly historic record of achievement in the finest 
traditions of American law and citizenship. 
And, finally, I believe that in the years ahead, she will be able to be a force for 
consensus-building on the Supreme Court just as she has been on the Court of 
Appeals, so that our judges can become an instrument of our common unity in the 
expression of their fidelity to the Constitution.67 
                                                                 
63 see Nancy Sherer, Diversifying The Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy For The U.S. Justice System 
Possible?, 105 Nw U. L. Rev. 587, 588 (2011).  
64 Schatz, supra at 27. 
65 Stephen Labaton, The Man Behind the High Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1993, 
www.nytimes.com/1993/06/17/us/the-man-behind-the-high-court-nominee.html?pagewanted=1. 
66 Halberstam, supra at 1452. 
67 The Supreme Court: Transcript of President’s Announcement and Judge Ginsburg’s Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, June 
15, 1993, at A1; see Halberstam, supra at 1452-1453. 
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In her explanation as to wanting to be a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg 
states, 
It is an opportunity beyond any other for one of my training to serve society.  The 
controversies that come to the Supreme Court, as the last judicial resort, touch and 
concern the health and well-being of our Nation and its people.  They affect the 
preservation of liberty to ourselves and our prosperity.  Serving on this Court is the 
highest honor, the most awesome trust, that can be placed in a judge.  It means 
working at my craft—working with and for the law—as a way to keep our society 
both ordered and free.68 
 
Her nomination was confirmed by a Senate 96-3 vote, and she took the bench on August 
3, 1993.69  She became the second woman in American history to be a member on the 
bench, joining Sandra Day O’Connor, and thus became the first Jewish woman on the 
bench.70   
H. Cancer Again… 
In 1999 Justice Ginsburg was diagnosed with colon cancer and almost 10 years later, she was 
diagnosed with pancreatic cancer.71  With expected resilience that she has shown since birth, 
Justice Ginsburg has conquered both cancers.72  Unfortunately, however, her husband Marty 
passed away in 2010.73  Shockingly, the next day following the death of her husband, Justice 
Ginsburg was in attendance in court and delivered an opinion from the bench.74  As one of her 
former law clerks has summed up in reflection of Justice Ginsburg’s obstacles, 
                                                                 
68 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 49 (1994) (statement of Ruth Bader Ginsburg); see 
Halberstam, supra at 1453. 
69 Olney, supra at 117. 
70 Id. 
71 Richard Wolf, Ginsburg’s Dedication Undimmed After 20 Years on the Court , USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/31/ginsburg-female-justices-no-shrinking-violets-/2606239/. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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[Justice Ginsburg has] had to ride a lot of ups and downs in her 20 years on the 
court.  Whether it’s facing down illness or most recently coping with the death of 
her husband, […] she has done it all with an incredible inner strength and a real 
iron will.  She’s a very tough person.75 
 
This iron will and resilience that Justice Ginsburg has demonstrated in her personal life, mirrors 
her jurisprudence that she has displayed for over 20 years on the bench. 
II. JURISPRUDENCE 
 
A. “Equal Citizenship Stature” 
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence can be coined as one that embraces “Equal 
Citizenship.”76  As Professor at New England Law, Neil S. Siegel, explains, Justice Ginsburg 
“recognizes the primacy of engaged citizens, social movements, and legal advocates in 
determining the ultimate success of any constitutional vision.”77  In her role as a judge she 
stressed in a 2004 lecture to students who attended the Hofstra Law School summer program in 
Nice, France that courts “are reactive institutions.  We don’t create the controversies that come to 
us, we respond to the problems that are emerging in the society the courts exist to serve.”78  In 
her view as a Justice, she echoes the ideology that the authority to promote social change lies in 
the power of the American people, and not the Court itself,79 thus making her decisions lean 
more towards the liberal left-wing. 
                                                                 
75 Id. 
76 see Neil S. Seigel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision , 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 
799, 810 (2009). 
77 Id. 
78 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks of Ruth Bader Ginsburg at CUNY School of Law  (Mar. 11, 2004), in 7 N.Y. CITY 
L. Rev. 221, 232 (2004). 
79 Seigel, supra at 811. 
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Justice Ginsburg’s law clerks have even described her jurisprudence as careful and even 
cautious when addressing controversial questions that appear before the Court, as opposed to a 
theoretical approach.80  Specifically, she is not deemed a judge who strictly interprets the 
Constitution word-for-word, yet her decisions mirror her ideological “understanding of the 
cultural ideals that our Constitution is charged with realizing over time.”81  Importantly, her 
decisions in effect, address her belief that the meaning of the Constitution changes over time just 
as society changes over time.82  She defends that her ideology is not one that strays from the 
Framers’ original intent, but yet in her view she states, “I think the Framers were intending to 
create a more perfect union that would become ever more perfect over time.”83  In essence, 
Justice Ginsburg’s decisional framework reflects her central purpose to afford “‘equal dignity’ to 
all Americans, including historically marginalized groups.”84 This includes: women, previously 
discriminated against races, individuals suffering disabilities and more just to name a few. 1 
1. Setting Precedent: Equal Access To The Courts 
In Justice Ginsburg’s exact words, she refers to her ideology of equal protection as, “the 
idea of essential dignity, that we are all people entitled to respect from our Government as 
persons of full human statute, and must not be treated as lesser creatures.”85  In a 6-3 decision, 
Justice Ginsburg delivered the majority opinion of M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,86 which held that a state may 
not deny an indigent parent the opportunity to appeal a judicial termination of her parental rights 
                                                                 
80 Seigel, supra at 814. 
81 Id. 
82 Seigel, supra at 815. 
83 The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 127 (1993) (statement of J. Ginsburg). 
84 Seigel, supra at 816. (citation omitted). 
85 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merrit, Affirmative Action: An Intentional Human Rights Dialogue , 21 
Cardozo L. Rev. 253, 239 (1999). 
86 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).   
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by requiring payment to prepare a trial court transcript.  Martha Minow classified this case as, “a 
work of great craftsmanship as well as a just and compassionate decision.”87  At the lower court, 
the Mississippi chancery court terminated petitioner M.L.B.’s parental rights to her two minor 
children and petitioner was estopped from appealing the termination decree because of her 
inability to pay for the trial record in advance as required by the Mississippi statute.88  The Court 
ultimately held that under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “just as a State may not block an indigent offender’s access to an appeal afforded to 
others, so Mississippi may not deny M.L.B., because of her poverty, appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent.”89 
The biological mother M.L.B. and the biological father S.L.J. divorced after nearly eight 
years of marriage.90  There were two children.91  As per the divorce agreement, the two children 
remained in their father’s S.L.J.’s custody.92  Only a few months later the father married 
respondent J.P.J.93 The following year, S.L.J. and J.P.J. filed suit in the chancery court seeking to 
terminate the parental rights of M.L.B. so that J.P.J. could be approved by the court to adopt the 
children.94  S.L.J. argued to the court that M.L.B. was in arrears in child support and had not 
been complying with the visitation decree.95  On the contrary, M.L.B. counterclaimed by seeking 
full custody of the children and alleged that S.L.J. had denied her visitation to see her children 
despite the divorce decree.96  The Chancellor terminated biological mother M.L.B.’s parental 
                                                                 
87 Martha Minow, Essays in Honor of Justice Ruth Ginsburg: M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) , 127 Harv. L. 
Rev. 461 (2013). 
88 M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 106 (The Mississippi statute required that the petitioner pay roughly $2,352.36 in advance). 
89 Id. at 107 (citations omitted). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.. 
96 Id. 
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rights and ordered that stepmother J.P.J.’s name be placed on the birth certificate of the children, 
because he declared there had been a “substantial erosion of the relationship” between M.L.B. 
and her children because of her failure to communicate with the minor children.97  Additionally, 
the Chancellor held that the father S.L.J. and stepmother met the required standard of clear and 
convincing evidence without revealing precise evidence as to how he came to that conclusion.98  
Within the following year M.L.B. filed a timely appeal and paid the required filing fee of $100, 
but could not produce the prepayment of the transcript as required for civil litigants in 
Mississippi who wanted to utilize their right to appeal.99  M.L.B. ultimately sought leave to 
appeal in forma pauperis, but her application was denied because, “the right to proceed in forma 
pauperis in civil cases exists only at the trial level.”100 
Justice Ginsburg writing for the Court began with Griffin v. Illinois,101 the foundation 
case concerning the general access to appeals.  That case involved criminal defendants and their 
access to appeals only when they could provide transcripts.102  The Court explicitly took notice 
that, “[a]lthough the Federal Constitution guarantees no right to appellate review, once a State 
affords that right, Griffin held, the State may not bolt the door to equal justice,”103 which is the 
underlying theme of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion did not 
seek to address or change precedent granting access to transcripts in criminal proceedings.  
Justice Ginsburg did however identify precedents that emphasized familial status as a compelling 
                                                                 
97 Id. at 107-9108. 
98 Id. at 108. 
99 Id.; see Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-51-3, 11-51-29 (Supp. 1996). 
100 Id. at 109. 
101 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (Holding that a state cannot deny indigent criminal defendants access to free trial transcripts 
who are seeking appellate review of their convictions.). 
102 Id. at 13-14 (plurality opinion). 
103 M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110 (citations omitted). 
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governmental interest104 as it was applicable to this case.  As evidentiary support, the Court 
discussed a line of cases that held that the importance of parental relationships and the familial 
structure, which implicates the heightened “clear and convincing standard” which the state bears 
the burden of proving.  Moreover according to Martha Minow, “[i]n the hierarchy of interests, 
M.L.B.’s concerns are even more weighty because she faced not simply loss of custody which 
does not sever the parent-child bond, but parental status termination, which is irretrievably 
destructive of the most fundamental family relationship.”105  Furthermore, although Justice 
Ginsburg acknowledged that the State may have had a strong interest in keeping costs low, in 
comparison to M.L.B. and the State, the State’s “pocketbook” interest of advance payment for a 
transcript to offset the costs of it’s judicial system is trivial to the dissolution of parental 
privileges which is at stake for M.L.B.106 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion invokes her ideology of equal protection irrespective 
of social class, race, gender, and so-forth.  As she writes for the majority she reiterates that this 
case although not categorized, as “criminal,” falls in line with precedent as the consequences that 
the Chancellor’s court would have on M.L.B. and her children, does not make it far removed 
from the Griffin’s interpretation.107  As one scholar explained, indigents like M.L.B, “[were] 
seeking to defend against devastating invasive action by the state comparable in severity with 
punishment for crime.”108  Justice Ginsburg simply shed light on the upshot that had the 
Chancellor court’s decision been affirmed, the decision would disproportionately forever 
terminate familial bonds of those who are indigent and therefore in lower social classes, and no 
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one else, which consequently would not open the floodgate for other cases which the dissent 
fears.109 
2.  Equal Protection In Gender 
Justice Ginsburg has been both a critical and important voice in addressing sex 
discrimination.  She has been an advocate for gender equality, evidenced by her long career 
combating gender discrimination, which proves to be true, as they are motivating factors that 
have sensitized her to stereotypes on the basis of “congenital and immutable biological traits of 
birth.”110  In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the Constitution reflected its potential of growth and a 
constant cycle of change as the times change when women were finally allowed to vote in the 
twentieth century, which is also when women were granted access to the political arena.111  In 
her experience, specifically involving her extensive involvement in the ACLU Women’s Rights 
Project, she developed her own effective litigation strategy to combat all forms of sex 
discrimination.112  And although she urges the members of the Court to “attend[] to the legal 
details of cases and materials, not simply the grand principles they may involve,”113 she does 
recognize that there are times where the philosophy of her decisions reflect her womanhood.  As 
she puts it, “Maybe there’s a little more empathy.  Anybody who has been discriminated against 
knows what it’s like,”114 which proves to reflect though her jurisprudence embracing equality for 
all. 
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a. Sex Discrimination In Education/Equal Opportunity in 
Education 
In one of her most important majority opinions, United States v. Virginia,115 Justice 
Ginsburg held that Virginia’s Military Institute’s (VMI) male-only admissions policy violated 
the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  When this decision 
was handed down, VMI founded in 1839, was the only single-sex (all-male institution) public 
college in Virginia.116  VMI had a distinctive mission to produce “citizen soldiers” through an 
“adversative” method that featured “physical rigor, mental stress, […] absence of privacy, 
minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.”117  In 1990 following a 
female high school student’s attempt to seek admission into VMI and being denied solely 
because of her sex, the Attorney General filed a complaint and sued the state of Virginia on the 
grounds that the exclusively male admission policy was a violation of Equal Protection.118 
In 1991 the District Court ruled in favor of VMI holding that the all-male institution 
brought diversity to Virginia’s coeducational system, that the only means of achieving diversity 
was to exclude women, and if women were to be admitted, then the university would have to 
alter some of its educational methods, thus making VMI less distinctive.119 Following the 
District Court’s decision, the United States appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
1992.  The Fourth Circuit recognized that denying women admission to the school violated the 
Equal Protection Clause, however, admitting women would materially affect three aspects of 
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VMI’s program –“physical training, the absence of privacy, and the adversative approach.”120  
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling and ordered the state of 
Virginia to remedy the constitutional violation,121 meaning VMI could either establish a “parallel 
institution” for women or become a private institution.122  In 1995 Virginia and VMI established 
the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL), located at Mary Baldwin College,123 
which was approved by both the District Court and Fourth Circuit, which held that VMI and 
VWIL were “sufficiently comparable.”124 The Supreme Court with an almost unanimous vote, 
reversed that decision. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg adopted a heightened level of intermediate 
scrutiny in relation to gender discrimination, first addressed in Mississippi University for Women 
v. Hogan,125 which held, “[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must 
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”126  In addressing the 
required heightened standard for gender discrimination, Justice Ginsburg explained, 
The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.  The State 
must show ‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves ‘important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.  The justification must 
be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.  And it 
must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, 
or preferences of males and females.  [citations and quotations omitted].127 
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Justice Ginsburg ultimately held that based on the facts of the case, the State failed its burden 
because the remedial program offered through VWIL did “not cure the constitutional 
violation,”128 as required. 
 Virginia argued that VMI’s policy of barring women served the important governmental 
objective of “diversity in educational approaches,” that there would be no alternative for VMI to 
maintain its unique “adversative method” of education if it were to admit women, and thus 
barring women from VMI was substantially related to achieving this goal.129  However, in 
response, Justice Ginsburg properly recognized that the State’s argument proffered was merely 
“a rationalization” for “actions in fact differently grounded.”130  The Justice first dissects the 
history of women in education and classifies it as one that is indicative of action more intentional 
as opposed to aberrant.131  Furthermore, the Court cautions reviewing courts to take a “hard 
look” at generalizations similar to those proffered by both Virginia and the District Court,132 
because those same stereotypical predictions were once, “routinely used to deny rights or 
opportunities”133 of the oppressed.  This is because, state actors who improperly attempt to 
control the gates of opportunity may not exclude qualified individuals based on “fixed notions 
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.”134  And furthermore, Virginia and 
VMI’s fears are once again not “solidly grounded” because women have successfully entered 
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military academies and the military force,135 which the Court addresses through the historical and 
current presence of women. 
 Justice Ginsburg also held that the remedial decree through VWIL was unconstitutional.  
The Court reasoned that such a proper remedy, “aims to eliminate [so far as possible] the 
discriminatory effects of the past and to bar like discrimination in the future.”136  The difference 
is however, that “Virginia chose not to eliminate, but to leave untouched, VMI’s exclusionary 
policy,”137 which fails to show substantial equality between both institutions as required by 
Sweatt v. Painter.138  In Sweat, Texas was reluctant to admit African Americans into the Texas 
Law School and in a remedial response they set up a separate law school for African American 
students.  The separate institution originally had no library and lacked accreditation unlike the 
original law school.  It eventually gained a faculty of five full-time professors, a student body of 
23 students, and a small library, which was still not comparable to the Texas Law School.  The 
Court unanimously ruled that state of Texas failed to show “substantial equality in the [separate] 
opportunities” of the two schools.  The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required 
Texas to admit African Americans to the Texas Law School.139  Just as the Court in Sweatt ruled 
that the State had failed to show “substantial equality” in the separate opportunities offered, 
Virginia too failed to meet that threshold.  In comparison to Sweatt, Ginsburg writes,  
Virginia has closed this facility to its daughters and, instead, has devised for them 
a “parallel program,” with a faculty less impressively credentialed and less well 
paid, more limited course offerings, fewer opportunities for military training and 
for scientific specialization.  Cf. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.  VMI, beyond question, 
“possesses to a far greater degree” than the VWIL program “those qualities which 
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a 
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…school,” including “position and influence of the alumni, standing in the 
community, traditions and prestige.”  Id. at 634.  Women seeking and fit for a VMI-
quality education cannot be offered anything less, under the Commonwealth’s 
obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection.140 
 
 As per the reflection of this decision, in cases involving gender classifications under 
equal protection, the Supreme Court applies a heightened scrutiny to determine whether the 
classification serves an important objective and also whether the policy is substantially related to 
the achievement of that objective.141  When addressing the constitutional challenges that 
accompany gender discrimination, Justice Ginsburg addresses individual merit and rejects the 
barriers that “deny women equal opportunities and respect as citizens,”142 as a means to stray 
away from historical stereotypes of men and women.  Her ideology of gender equality hinges on 
“individual merit, individual achievement, and eliminating barriers that treat women as women, 
rather than individuals.”143  This philosophy is sometimes labeled “egalitarian and liberal” as it 
applies the same treatment to men and women equally.144 
 In the present case, Justice Ginsburg not only went through the history of VMI, but also 
recognized that the objective of the State has to be an actual state purpose, and not simply a 
rationalization or a cover-up for what the State is really trying to achieve,145 which is gender 
discrimination.  Furthermore, she relied on findings that revealed that there were some women, 
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although excluded because of their sex and overbroad generalizations, who could meet the 
rigorous requirements of VMI and its physical expectations.146  As one scholar suggested, 
The extent of Justice Ginsburg’s commitment to liberal, individualist principles can 
be further appreciated by what she did not require or consider.  She did not focus 
on whether a significant number of women would be admitted under a new policy, 
nor did she require a different admissions standard for women to promote 
substantive equality.  Rather, the Court simply required that VMI allow women to 
try to meet the existing standards of the school and emphasized the importance of 
allowing women with appropriate credentials—the will, capacity, and fitness—the 
opportunity to apply and be admitted to the elite program.147 
 
The VMI decision embraced the equality of women through individual opportunities, as 
it is proven to be “[f]undamental to Ginsburg’s philosophy that all individuals have the 
constitutional right to be able to use their talents, unencumbered by labels such as […] 
gender.”148  Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion is deemed a landmark decision because 
it celebrates “individual dignity of women.”  The decision symbolized women’s freedom 
to choose different opportunities for education, to grant opportunities for one’s future, 
and to open up any other array of choices to both men and women.149  
b. Employment Discrimination 
In a 5-4 ruling of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,150 Justice Ginsburg 
delivered the dissenting opinion from the bench.  The majority decision reversed the long-
standing rule that allowed victims of pay discrimination to challenge the discrimination as long 
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as employee continued to receive lower paychecks than his or her colleagues.  Although a pay 
discrimination case, the gender discrimination undertones were prevalent.  The plaintiff, a retired 
female employee brought a pay discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, against her former employer and the plaintiff won a jury award in her favor.151  However, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the jury award finding that the 
plaintiff’s claims were barred, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision.152 
In reviewing the proper application for the statute of limitations period, the Court 
reasoned that it had previously held that the proper time for filing a claim of employment 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (including discrete 
acts of discrimination such as a pay-setting decision), begins at the moment when the 
discrimination occurs.153  At trial plaintiff Ledbetter proffered evidence that during the course of 
her employment, several supervisors had given her poor evaluations due to her sex, that because 
of those unfair and discriminatory evaluations her pay was not increased as much as it would 
have been if the evaluations were fair, and that the past pay decisions continued to effect the 
amount of pay she received during the rest of the course of her employment.154  Additionally, 
toward the end of the course of her employment with defendant Goodyear, Ledbetter was being 
paid less than all of her male colleagues and consequently, at trial, the jury awarded her backpay 
damages based on the facts presented.155  On appeal defendant Goodyear argued that Ledbetter’s 
pay discrimination claim was barred, because the EEOC claim was filed after the allotted 180 
days – thus 180 days after the unlawful employment practice occurred, and this Court agreed.156  
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The majority held that Ledbetter had the burden of proving that her employer had “intentionally” 
discriminated against her when they deprived her of wages, and shockingly did not acknowledge 
the fact that Ledbetter was deprived of wages from paycheck to paycheck as a means of 
intentional discrimination.157  In absence of any policy determinations that could have been 
made, the majority did not engage in a fact analysis, yet only determined when the statute of 
limitations would begin to run according to the unambiguous language of the applicable 
statute.158 
Although the Court seemed to take a strict interpretation approach of the EEOC statute,159 
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, chose to focus on the individual merits of the case and decide 
accordingly.  Justice Ginsburg discussed the facts and placed emphasis on the remedial effects 
the majority decision would have on employees bringing this type of claim.  She took note that 
Ledbetter’s salary was initially in line with the salaries of her male coworkers performing similar 
work,160however over the course of her twenty years of employment, Ledbetter’s salary slipped 
starkly in comparison to the fifteen males in her profession.  Shockingly Ledbetter was being 
paid $3,727 per month while the area male managers were receiving between $4,286-$5,236 per 
month.161  In her dissent from the bench, Justice Ginsburg informed other members of the Court 
of the realities of cases involving pay discrepancies.  Not only is pay discrimination uneasy to 
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identify, but if these discriminatory practices are ever revealed, they are only exposed over time.  
She states, 
Pay discrepancies often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; 
cause to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time.  
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from the employee’s view.  
Employers may keep under wraps the pay differentials maintained among 
supervisors, no less the reasons for those differentials.  Small initial discrepancies 
may not be seen as meet for a federal case, particularly when the employee, trying 
to succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to making waves. 
Pay discrepancies are thus significantly different from adverse actions, “such as 
termination, failure to promote,…or refusal to hire,” all involving fully 
communicated discrete acts, “easy to identify” as discriminatory.  See National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 
153 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002).  It is only when the disparity becomes apparent and 
sizable, e.g., through future raises calculated as a percentage of current salaries, 
than an employee in Ledbetter’s situation is likely to comprehend her plight and, 
therefore, to complain.  Her initial readiness to give her employer the benefit of the 
doubt should not preclude her from later challenging the then current and 
continuing payment of a wage depressed on account of her sex.162 
 
In her attack on the majority for interpreting the statute so narrowly without understanding the 
detrimental effects that the statute decision would have on women especially those who are 
employed in a “nontraditional environment” such as Ledbetter, she informs the majority that it is 
seldom that an employee will raise concerns of pay differences or even question that such 
unlawful practices are occurring in the workplace.163  Not only did Goodyear keep the salaries of 
its employees confidential, but they also ensured that the employees had limited access to the 
competing salaries of one another, which causes more suspicion leading towards Goodyear’s 
discriminatory practices.164 
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 Justice Ginsburg informed the majority that under the strict and narrow interpretation of 
its ruling, “each and every pay decision [Ledbetter] did not immediately challenge wiped the 
slate clean,” thus failing to give consideration to the fact that the paychecks themselves serve as 
cumulative evidence that Ledbetter was paid less than her male counterparts simply because she 
was a female.165  Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg expressed that in lieu of the narrow decision, 
that the Court’s approval of Goodyear’s discriminatory practices are in direct conflict with the 
robust protection against discrimination in the workplace that Congress intended Title VII to 
safeguard.166  Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg’s position on this case stemmed from “[t]he realities 
of the workplace”167 and the “real-world characteristics”168 of discrimination within the 
employment sector.  According to one scholar, “[i]t was here that the Justice drew upon her 
feminist leanings and explained why the majority’s ruling was impractical and unfair.”169  Her 
dissenting opinion contended that employees who are victims of employment discrimination 
should be allotted time to discover the discrimination as it is “easy to identify”170 and then bring 
their suits as it will urge employers to correct the inequalities pursuant to the threat of 
litigation.171 
This decision was a true reflection of Justice Ginsburg’s strong disagreement with the 
“majority’s cut back on women’s rights.”172  The most important part of Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent is her challenge to Congress to correct the Court’s ruling as she proclaims, “[o]nce again, 
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the ball is in Congress’s court.”173  And although Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was a dissent it was 
not in vain.  Justice Ginsburg recognizes that, “The greatest dissents do become court opinions 
and gradually over time in their views become the dominant view.  So that’s the dissenter’s 
hope: that they are writing not for today but for tomorrow,”174 and this came to fruition.  Less 
than two years following this powerful dissent read directly from the bench, President Obama 
signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.  The initial ruling of the Court both ignored and 
undermined the realities of discriminatory pay, by unduly restricting the time period in which 
these victims could bring their claims and seek compensation.  However, the purpose of the Act 
is to allow the opportunity for victims of pay discrimination to introduce evidence of unlawful 
employment practices that have occurred outside of the time frame for the filing charge of the 
discriminatory acts,175 which effectively overrides the Ledbetter majority decision.176 
c. Harassment In The Workplace 
It is important to note that Justice Ginsburg’s dedication to combating all forms of 
discrimination did not “occur in a vacuum,” rather it was because of her perception of the 
countless injustices occurring in her life and around her.177  And thus, her perceptions of the 
inequalities laid the foundation for her personal ideology for equal citizenship structure,178 
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including cases involving harassment in the workplace.  In a 5-4 decision in Vance v. Ball State 
University,179 the Court addressed who can qualify as a “supervisor” under a Title VII180 claim 
for harassment in the workplace.  There are different standards of liability depending on whether 
the harasser is a “supervisor” or a co-worker.  Specifically, under Title VII if the harasser 
classifies as a co-worker, the employer is only liable if it were negligent in the control of the 
workplace conditions.181  However, if the harasser is a “supervisor” then,  
 [H]arassment culminates in a tangible employment action, [and] the employer is 
strictly liable.  But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may 
escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that 
the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective 
opportunities that the employer provided.182   
 
The Court held that an employee is classified as a “supervisor” only when the employer can take 
tangible actions regarding employment against the victim and held that the harasser in this case 
was not a “supervisor.”183 
 The victim, Ms. Vance was an African American woman who worked as a catering 
assistant for the defendant harasser.  Ms. Vance filed numerous internal complaints with the 
defendant employers alleging racial discrimination and harassment and discrimination by 
employee Saundra Davis, who was a white woman.184  The Court reasoned that since Davis did 
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not have the power neither to hire nor fire Vance, nor have the authority to take any other 
tangible actions against Vance, Davis was not a “supervisor” under law, thus the employer was 
not liable.185  In coming to its conclusion, the Court relies on its Ellerth/Faragher186 framework 
to exhibit the mesh between the theory of vicarious liability and the legitimate interests that the 
employers hold.187  And although the victim, Vance urges the Court to rely on the general 
meaning of “supervisor” in legal contexts, the Court chooses otherwise and reasons that the word 
“supervisor” has different meanings in colloquia l settings and in the law, thus making her 
assertion unsuccessful.188 
 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg “catalogued the ways in which the Court’s decision 
turned a blind eye to the realities of the workplace.”189  She initially starts by expressing her 
belief that the Court axed out the fact that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) provided guidelines of harassment after the Ellerth/Faragher framework.190  In her 
opinion, she writes that since the Court strays away from what the EEOC classifies as 
“supervisors,” meaning those who, “control the day-to-day schedules and assignments of others, 
[thus only] confining the category to those formally empowered to take tangible employment 
actions,” the Court’s ruling is inconsistent with the intentions of the EEOC definition because an 
individual like Ms. Davis who has the authority to orchestrate an employee’s daily activities 
constitutes a “supervisor” under Title VII.191  As proof, Justice Ginsburg notes that the 
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distinction that the Ellerth/Faragher framework draws between co-workers and supervisors 
exposes the true realities of the workplace.  In her view, not only are there rare instances when 
the victim can tell a harasser to “buzz off” but the same victim can be subject to retaliation for 
speaking up, which causes greater problems for the victim.192  Justice Ginsburg then goes on to 
list an extensive list of instances of harassment in the workplace, but urges the Court to realize 
that under the Court’s definition of “supervisor” none of the women in the illustrations would be 
allowed to bring claims.193  Despite the precedent set forth, the Court nonetheless holds a narrow 
reading of a “supervisor” which goes against the EEOC’s definition and intention.194   
As Justice Ginsburg read the opinion from the bench, she posed an actual hypothetical 
where a female worker who is employed by a road crew is constantly harassed by a “lead 
worker” who is in charge of directing the daily operations of the employees, but cannot hire or 
fire the employees.195  The Vance majority opinion would leave the female worker without a 
remedy against her employer or supervisor.196  Furthermore, as she did in the Ledbetter decision, 
Justice Ginsburg calls on Congress to “correct the error into which this Court has fallen, and to 
restore the robust protections against workplace harassment the Court weakens today.”197  In line 
with Justice Ginsburg’s goal of equality for all, she takes the stance that the Court’s 
determination will “hinder efforts to stamp out discrimination in the workplace,”198 which 
effectively goes against the living Constitution. 
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3.  Equal Protection In Race 
Justice Ginsburg recognizes that, “the word “‘equal’ or ‘equality’ does not appear in the 
body of the U.S. Constitution or in the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments,”199 however her 
“equal citizenship stature” ideology is mirrored by the progression of the U.S. Constitution.  She  
sees the “Constitutional history of the United States as an extension of the original rights to once 
excluded groups.”200  The Founding Fathers’ commitment to equality can be echoed by the fact 
that in 1868 slavery ended following the Civil War and the U.S. Constitution provided that no 
State “shall…deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.”201  Consequently, “In race 
cases [Justice Ginsburg] has urged the same distinction between keeping a door closed and 
opening it that she has drawn in gender cases.  Lastly, she also has viewed mechanical 
application of the tiers of scrutiny as impeding realization of the Constitution’s equality 
command.”202  
a. Voting Discrimination 
In her address to the students of Hofstra Law’s summer program Justice Ginsburg alluded 
to the words of famous historian Richard Morris when she said, “a prime (and still evolving) 
portion of the history of the U.S. Constitution, and a cause for celebration, is the story of the 
extension (through amendment, judicial interpretation, and practice) of constitutional rights and 
protections to once ignored or excluded people: to once ignored or excluded people: to humans 
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who were once held in bondage, to men without property, to the original inhabitants of the land 
that became the United States, and to women.”203 
In a 5-4 decision in Shelby County v. Holder,204 the Court ruled that Section 4(b) of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 was unconstitutional.  As expected and in line with her “equality for 
all” view, Justice Ginsburg read the dissenting opinion from the bench, “an unusual move and 
sign of deep disagreement.”205  At issue is the constitutionality of Section 5 and Section 4(b).  
Section 5 requires the States to obtain permission from the federal government prior to enacting 
any voting laws.206  Section 4 applied this requirement to only a select number of states, 
specifically nine, “—Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia—and to scores of counties and municipalities in other states, 
including Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx.”207  The purpose of the Sections of this Act was 
to address, “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our 
country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”208 
The case first came to the Court after Shelby County sued the Attorney General in 
Alabama, which is a covered jurisdiction under the Act after objecting to some voting 
changes.209  The county sued seeking a declaratory judgment that both Section 4(b) and Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act were facially unconstitutional, and seeking a permanent injunction 
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against enforcing both laws.210  In holding that Section 4(b) was unconstitutional, the Court 
reasoned that not only does the Constitution grant the States sovereignty, but there is also a 
“fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the States,”211 resulting in disparate 
treatments of the States.212  To illustrate their determination, the majority points out the fact that 
two neighboring States may have a desire to enact the same law, yet State A would have to wait 
until they receive preclearance from the federal government, whereas State B could immediately 
put the law in effect through normal legislative procedures.213  Furthermore, the majority 
asserted that the Act “authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local 
policymaking, and represents an extraordinary departure from the traditional course of relations 
between the States and Federal Government.  As reiterated […], the Act constitutes 
extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system.”214 
In addressing its reasons for now ruling that Section 4(b) is unconstitutional, the Court 
first drew on the distinctions between society as it was prior to the law, and society 50 years 
later.  For the Court, the coverage formula under Section 4(b) made sense 50 years ago because it 
presented the Court with a problem that warranted a solution.  However, according to the 
majority, 
We found that Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where 
immediate action seemed necessary.  The areas where Congress found evidence of 
actual voting discrimination shared two characteristics: the use of tests and devices 
for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 
points below the national average.  We explained that tests and devices are relevant 
to voting discrimination because of their long history as a tool for perpetrating the 
evil; a low voting rate is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread 
disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual voters.  We 
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therefore concluded that the coverage formula was rational in both practice and 
theory.  It accurately reflected those jurisdictions uniquely characterized by voting 
discrimination on a pervasive scale, linking coverage to the devices used to 
effectuate discrimination and to the resulting disenfranchisement.  The formula 
ensured that the stringent remedies were aimed at areas where voting discrimina tion 
had been most flagrant.215   
 
Although the Court agrees that the law was originally constitutional based on the existing 
discrimination in society 50 years ago, the Court now asserts that things are “drastically” 
different today.216  Justice Ginsburg disagrees.217  Moreover, to prove its point, the Court alleges 
that blatant discrimination is rare, minorities hold political positions, literacy tests and the like 
have been banned, and voter registration has surpassed 50 percent.218 
 The Court next addressed the constitutionality of the coverage formula, which, “looked to 
cause (discriminatory tests) and effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tailored the 
remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both.”219  The Court once again using the 
number of years to drive its decision, reasoned that 50 years ago when there was racial 
discrimination, the blatant racial disparity in voter registration turnout was a compelling 
government interest that justified the preclearance requirement and coverage formula.220  
However, since the Court no longer finds a disparity, and statistics exhibit the continuous 
movement of society away from discriminatory practices, the Act no longer serves a compelling 
governmental interest.221  And although the Fifteenth Amendment is supposed to serve its 
purpose of ensuring a better future, it should not punish those for past mistakes or ignorance222 
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since Section 4(b) divides the States into groups of those with recent voting discrimination and 
those who do not hold those discriminatory practices, this is unfair and no longer viable 
according to the majority.223  In effect, this justification for the Act cannot be based on practices 
of the past in an effort to be applicable today. 
 Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Ginsburg wrote 
a powerful dissent in which she attacked the reasoning of the majority.  She urges that the 
Court’s ruling hinges on the dormancy of the Act, which is not sufficient to make it therefore 
unconstitutional.  According to Justice Ginsburg, “Voting discrimination still exists; no one 
doubts that.  But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be the best suited to block 
that determination.”224  More importantly, in her attempt to open the eyes of the majority she 
makes plain and blatant that the Voting Rights Act was a solution to a sickness of a nation that 
continues to have need to be monitored.225 
 As in most of her voting rights cases, Justice Ginsburg urged the majority to defer to 
Congress, “which has been given sweeping powers under the Constitution, and especially in 
amendments passed after the Civil War, to protect such rights.”226  Congress made findings that 
that the Voting Rights Act preclearance requirements and coverage formulas needed to be 
extended for an additional 25 years, yet the Court unequivocally disregarded those findings.227  
Additionally, voting rights and equality is not over simply because the tactics of those who seek 
                                                                 
223 Id. at 2628. 
224 Id. at 2633. 
225 Id. at 2634, (“The Votingg Rights Act became one of the most consequential, efficacious, and amply justified 
exercises of federal legislative power in our Nation’s history.”). 
226 John Schwartz, Between the Lines of the Voting Rights Act Opinion , N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/25/us/annotated-supreme-court-decision-on-voting-rights-
act.html?_r=0 
227 133 S. Ct. at 2636-2638. 
 37 
to suppress voting changed,228 it continues to be a problem and the majority “errs egregiously by 
overriding Congress’ decision,” in which both Martin Luther King Jr. and the nation have been 
given a disservice by the Court’s decision.229  In her dissent from the bench, she powerfully 
states the words and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
The great man who led the march from Selma to Montgomery and there called for 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act foresaw progress, even in Alabama, […].  The 
arc of the moral universe is long, he said, but it bends toward justice, if there is a 
steadfast commitment to see the task through to completion.230 
 
In yet another blow to the majority’s incorrect ruling on this decision, Justice Ginsburg states, 
“Consideration for this long history, still in living memory, was altogether appropriate.  The 
Court criticizes Congress for failing to recognize that history did not end in 1965.”231  But Justice 
Ginsburg urged the Court to give deference to Congress in their decision to reauthorize the Act 
in 2006 by large majorities.232  In closing and in extreme disappointment, Justice Ginsburg 
focuses on the realities of the Court’s ruling and cautions the majority that, “history repeats 
itself.”233 
b. Affirmative Action 
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence regarding affirmative action programs “demonstrate[s] 
less skepticism and greater tolerance for government policies that give preferences to racial 
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minorities.”234  Her decisions reflecting this ideology take into account the position of particular 
racial groups in society rather than the singular needs of an individual.235  Her opinions regarding 
issues of affirmative action reflect themes of “antisubordination”, which reflect the same themes 
of equality for all emphasized in her gender discrimination cases.236  In Justice Ginsburg’s view, 
before minorities can actually enjoy the true equality of opportunity provided for all under the 
Constitution, racial barriers have to be knocked down.237 
In the 7-1 decision of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,238 Justice Ginsburg 
delivered her opinion as the lone dissenter.  The majority reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, stating that it’s ruling was incorrect because it was to apply strict scrutiny to the facts of 
the case.239  In this case, the University of Texas considered race as one of many factors in its 
undergraduate admissions process, as a means for increasing a minority presence on campus.240  
Fisher, a Caucasian female brought this suit against the university after her application was 
denied, under the presumption that the admissions process was in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.241  
Following the decisions of Grutter v. Bollinger242 and Gratz v. Bollinger,243 the 
University of Texas at Austin adopted the disputed admissions program that explicitly 
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considered race in addition to other factors of the applicant, although the university does not 
assign a numerical number for race identification.244  In addressing the question presented, the 
Court relied on precedent and reasoned that such admissions programs cannot be tailored in such 
a way that it reflects a quota system.245  The program however, must be flexible enough so that 
applicants are reviewed on an individual level in a manner where race is not the essential feature 
of his or her application.246  In order for the university to withstand strict scrutiny, it has to prove 
that its program furthers a compelling interest and that the use of the race classification is 
necessary to the furtherance of the program’s purpose.247   
Although the majority agreed that the University of Texas at Austin receives deference 
with respect to its compelling interest of establishing diversity in the classroom,248 it is then the 
job of the Court to determine whether using race is necessary for the purpose of diversity.249  If 
the Court can find that diversity on campus and in the classroom can be achieved without using 
race as a factor in the application process, then the university has failed to meet its burden.250  
The majority ultimately found the lower court’s ruling incorrect because the courts focused on, 
“whether [the University’s] decision to reintroduce race as a fact in admissions was made in 
good faith,”251 which does not reflect the required application of strict scrutiny. 
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Writing as the lone dissent, Justice Ginsburg expresses her discontent with the majority’s 
decision.  As her jurisprudence reflects, “In cases dealing with race-based affirmative action, 
[Justice Ginsburg] has associated herself with the long-standing view of Justice Stevens that race 
is a legitimate consideration for governmental action when it is considered for purposes of 
inclusion rather than inclusion.”252  In her view, not only does the University of Texas at Austin 
model its admissions policy after the Harvard program referenced in Bakke, but also she notes 
that the University did not use a quota system.253  The University carefully modeled its program 
in a way that would steer clear of infringing on constitutional rights, yet the majority applied a 
strict scrutiny standard and remanded the case for further fact proceedings.  Justice Ginsburg 
expresses that she appreciates the University’s effort because, “[i]t is race consciousness, not 
blindness to race, that drives such plans.”254  Furthermore, under the majority’s ruling, it poses as 
a concern to Justice Ginsburg, that universities in the future may choose to hide their methods of 
inclusion in order to maintain minority participation on campus.255 Justice Ginsburg also 
expressed that she did not think that there was a need to remand the case back to the lower courts 
since the University’s program passed muster under the Court’s holdings in other affirmative 
action cases.   
Justice Ginsburg’s goal of equality is clearly present in the current dissent.  She does not 
hesitate to express discontent with the majority, and she emphasizes the need to promote 
methods of inclusion for minorities as that same ideology is reflected in the progress of the 
Constitution.  As a journalist expressed, “Ginsburg also took the opportunity to reiterate her view 
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that affirmative action is an appropriate way to rectify historical discrimination.”256  Justice 
Ginsburg writes, “I have several times explained why government actors, including state 
universities, need not blind themselves to the still lingering, every day evidence, effects of 
centuries of law-sanctioned inequality.”257   
c. Searches And Seizures 
In a unanimous decision, Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court in Fla. v. 
J.L.,258 which addressed questions of criminal procedure, specifically involving searches and 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  The question presented before the Court was whether an 
anonymous tip than an individual is in possession of a gun is sufficient to justify a stop and frisk 
of that individual without any other information.259  The Court held that an anonymous tip 
without anything more is not a valid justification of a stop and frisk.260 
In this case, an anonymous caller reported that a young African American male was in 
possession of a gun.261  The unidentified caller stated that the young male was wearing a plaid 
shirt and standing at a named bus stop in the Miami-Dade area.262  Approximately six minutes 
after the tip was made, two officers ventured to the bus stop and located the young African 
American male and frisked him, seized the gun, and arrested the respondent J.L.263 The record 
states prior to the seizing of the gun, that the gun was not visible on J.L., that J.L. made no 
threatening or suspicious movements, and that other than the tip the officers had no reason to 
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suspect the respondent for carrying a concealed weapon.264  The respondent, almost 16 at the 
time, was charged under Florida state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license, 
and for possessing such firearm under the legal age of 18.265 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg first started with the Terry v. Ohio266 decision, 
in which the Supreme Court first addressed “stop and frisk,” which allows police officers to 
conduct searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion which constitutes a lower threshold for 
reasons of protective measures of society.267  In the Terry case the Court held, 
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and 
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for 
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search 
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might 
be used to assault him.268 
 
The Court specifically differentiated the present case from Terry in that the officers’ inkling that 
J.L. was carrying a concealed weapon was not their own observations but solely based on a tip 
that they cannot even attest to the veracity of the informant and his or her character.269  The 
Court however, recognized that the only time when an anonymous tip absent any other 
information can arise to a constitutional search and seizure is when the anonymous tip 
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demonstrates, “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the 
investigatory stop” as required by Terry.270 
 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the anonymous tip in the case at bar lacked sufficient 
reliability to make the search of J.L. constitutional because the call lacked any other predictive 
information of the respondent’s movements or activities that would allow the officers to test the 
informant’s credibility.271  The officers fell short in that they unreasonably relied on a bare bones 
tip that only accurately described the description of the respondent from an unknown and 
unascertained individual.  There was nothing in the facts to firmly suggest that based on the tip, 
that the unidentified caller gave, that J.L. was actively engaging in criminal activity at the time 
he was unconstitutionally searched as required by a Terry stop.  Lastly, Justice Ginsburg 
provides a list of situations in which the prerequisite justifications of the veracity of an 
anonymous tip is not required.272 
 Justice Ginsburg’s approach to search and seizure cases is evidenced as “positive 
gradualism,” which one scholar describes as, “writing or joining a majority opinion that tries to 
emulate her incrementally-attained success in gender discrimination cases by moving the Court 
in a defendant-oriented direction.”273  Her majority opinion relies on precedent and an activist 
approach to the protection of rights for all.  Additionally, Justice Ginsburg determines her 
decisions on the level of intrusion the government would have on an individual – meaning the 
more intrusion the more likely she is to side with the individual defendant.  Her goal seems to be 
to preserve personal liberties of the individual and to ensure that everyone is afforded an 
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expected level of privacy irrespective of a police officer’s discretion regarding criminal activity 
of the accused.  This view falls in line with her jurisprudence regarding race discrimination in 
that she continues to avow the “equal citizenship stature” in cases involving searches and 
seizures, specifically the stop and frisk laws that disproportionately effect African Americans, 
Hispanics, and other minorities.274  Her view on Fourth Amendment issues of searches and 
seizures comes within her view of the “Constitution as a dynamic [living] document.”275  She 
believes “the Framers saw the neutral magistrate as an essential part of the criminal process 
shieling all of us, good or bad, saint or sinner, from unchecked police activity.”276  
4.  Equal Protection In Disabilities 
In cases involving individuals with disabilities, Justice Ginsburg continues to “interpret 
equality-based acts of Congress,”277 through her decisions.  In her jurisprudence, the main 
purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990278 is to reflect the notion that 
“[i]ncluding individuals with disabilities among people who count in composing ‘We the 
People.’”279 Her decisions reflect this ideology.  In Bragdon v. Abbott,280 the Court vacated the 
Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, after concluding that 
the patient’s asymptomatic HIV provided protection from discrimination under the ADA as it 
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was an impairment that substantially limited major life activities in her life.  The only way a 
medical professional could refuse treatment and not suffer any consequences for his or her 
discriminatory actions was to prove to the Court that he or she or others, would be put at risk for 
performing medical services.  The doctor in this case failed to meet his burden.  Justice Kennedy 
delivered the majority opinion for the Court in which Justice Ginsburg joined as well as 
delivering a separate occurrence.  
In the case at bar the Court addressed the application of the ADA to individuals infected 
with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).  In order for individuals such as Abbott and the 
like, to secure protection from discrimination under the ADA, the individual bears the burden of 
proving that she or he has an impairment that substantially limits major life activities.281  In an 
effort to determine whether Dr. Bragdon discriminated against Abbott when he refused to 
perform dental work on her using his facilities, thus subjecting her to a greater payment, the 
Court had to determine if her claim fell within an ADA claim.  In doing so, the Court first 
addressed whether the HIV infection qualifies as a disability under the ADA even when the 
symptoms have not surfaced and then, determined whether the treatment of the infection 
constitutes a safety concern to medical professionals, specifically a dentist. 
Respondent Abbott had been infected with HIV for approximately 8 years and at the time 
of the suit her infection had yet to progress into serious symptoms.282  On September 16, 1994 
respondent Abbott went to petitioner Bragdon’s (who is a dentist) office where she revealed her 
HIV status on the patient paperwork.283  During the dental examination, Dr. Bragdon found a 
cavity and informed Respondent Abbott of his personal policy of performing dental work for 
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HIV patients.284  Dr. Bragdon informed Abbott that he could fill her cavity at a local hospital 
instead of his office, for free, however she would be responsible for the hospital fees of using 
their facilities for the procedure.285  Abbott declined Dr. Bragdon’s offer and sued him for 
discrimination under § 302 of the ADA for her HIV disability.286 
The Court first held that Abbott’s HIV status constituted a disability under § 12102(2) of 
the ADA because her infection constitutes, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.287  The Court then went through 
the medical diagnosis of HIV and its life altering effects irrespective of whether the disease is 
asymptomatic or not.  The Court ultimately holds that it satisfies the regulatory definition of a 
physical impairment during all stages of the disease as it attacks the lymphatic systems.288  Next, 
the Court concluded that Abbott’s HIV infection limits major life activities, specifically her 
ability to reproduce, as “reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the 
life process itself.”289  The Court recognized that HIV limits Abbott, and therefore constitutes a 
disability under the ADA in two ways: “First, a woman infected with HIV who tries to conceive 
a child imposes on the man a significant risk of becoming infected.  […] Second, an infected 
woman risks infecting her child during gestation and childbirth, i.e., perinatal transmission.”290 
Since the Court agrees that Abbott’s disease constitutes as a disability under the ADA, 
the Court next addresses whether Abbott’s infection “posed a threat to the safety of others,”291 as 
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it would be the only reason Dr. Bragdon could have refused to treat Abbott.  In her short and 
sweet concurrence, Justice Ginsburg candidly writes that HI, “has been regarded as a disease 
limiting life itself.”292  She points out that those infected with HIV are limited in their activities 
of simple things such as obtaining healthcare services because of the reactions of others, like Dr. 
Bragdon who did indeed act differently toward a patient once the illness was unveiled.  Without 
hesitation and in as few words as possible, she writes, “No rational legislator, it seems to me 
apparent, would require nondiscrimination once symptoms become visible but permit 
discrimination when the disease, though present, is not yet visible.293  Her concurrence although 
short, is clear, convincing, and convicting.  Notably, her concurring opinions as in the this case, 
follow a certain format: 
[S]he does not engage in a lengthy regurgitation of the majority opinion.  Rather, 
she strikes out on her own legal footing to limit or expound on the Court’s holding 
in order to prevent its future misuse or misapplication and to raise open questions 
that she feels the majority opinion should have addressed.  Her vision is therefore 
turned toward the horizon of future cases.294 
 
As scholar Neil S. Siegel explains, “[D]isability issues were not new to Justice Ginsburg 
when she encountered them as a judge,” because, “much of her early work as a legal advocate 
was concerned with pregnancy, which can interfere with the performance of certain job 
functions,” thus drawing on Justice Ginsburg’s familiarity with disability cases.295  According to 
Professor Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg endorses the view of disability rights in that “disability 
was neither a personal tragedy nor a source of inspiration for the nondisabled; disability was a 
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minority-group status imposed by a society that was not accessible to individuals with physical 
or mental impairments that deviated too far from the norm.”296  Justice Ginsburg’s concurring 
opinion, “focused directly on an issue that is of major concern to disability rights activists: the 
way that society, by its reactions to specific impairments, makes those impairments disabling.”297  
In an attempt to exhibit the Framers’ intention to include individuals with disabilities in the “We 
the People” ideology, Justice Ginsburg through her opinions argues that these individuals are 
entitled to protection because like gender discrimination and race discrimination, society 
attempts to limit their opportunities298—thus society’s historic response to these issues.299 
5.  Abortion  
According to Siegel, “The ideal of equal citizenship stature animates Justice Ginsburg’s 
approach to the permissibility of government regulation of abortion.”300  Her legal analysis of 
abortion focuses primarily on “the woman’s equality aspect” in respect to her reproductive 
rights, which reflect the “equal-regard values involved in cases on abortion,”301 rather than the 
actual right to privacy.302  Such laws that restrict a woman’s access to abortion or other 
contraceptive methods pose a threat to the equal citizenship of all women,303 since it “depriv[es] 
women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.”304 
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a. Reproductive Rights 
In a 5-4 majority decision of Stenberg v. Carhart,305 Justice Ginsburg provided the 
necessary fifth vote for the majority opinion, but authored her own concurring opinion, and 
joined Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion.  In this case, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that banned “partial birth abortions.”  The statute defined a 
“partial birth abortion” as one where the woman gives birth to a living unborn child vaginally 
and then kills the child upon completion of the delivery.306  A violation of such statute yields a 
prison sentence of up to 20 years and a fine up to $25,000 as it is classified as a felony.307  The 
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for two specific reasons: (1) the Nebraska ban on 
“partial birth abortions” does not include a health exception which threatens a woman’s health 
and (2) the language of the statute “encompasses the most common method of second-trimester 
abortion, placing a substantial obstacle in the path for women seeking abortions,” thus imposing 
an undue burden on the women.308 
The Court began its majority decision by reviewing the basic principles regarding 
abortion jurisprudence.  The Court thus reiterates the established rule that abortion bans must 
contain a health exception that would permit the abortion to be performed as a means to preserve 
the health of the mother, which this statute failed to encompass.309  Additionally, the Court held 
that a health exception is also required by the Constitution when, “state regulations force women 
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to use riskier methods of abortion.”310  In the Court’s view, “So long as ‘substantial medical 
authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger 
women’s health,’ the Constitution ‘requires the statute to include a health exception when the 
procedure is ‘necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or 
health of the mother.’”311 
Next, the Court rejects the argument that the statute does not need an exception because 
abortions rarely if ever use the specified D&X312 method.313  In response the Court recognizes 
that a statute that altogether forbids a particular procedure, is in itself dangerous irrespective of 
the rarity of the procedure because allowing the statute creates an enormous health risk to those 
“rare” women who may have the procedure done.314  And in addition to finding that the statute is 
unconstitutional in that it lacks a health exception, the Court further finds that the law is also 
unconstitutional because the language of the statute regarding banned procedures encompasses 
both D&X procedures and D&Es315 which account for more than 95% of second-trimester 
abortions that are performed.316  This places an undue burden on the woman.317 
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Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion joined by Justice Stevens, stresses that the statute 
itself only targeted a specific method of an abortion procedure, although there is no abortion 
method that actually saves the fetus from death.318  According to her,  
[T]he law’s sole purpose was to place an obstacle in the path of woman seeking an 
abortion, for in banning a particular method of abortion, it did not seek to protect 
the health or lives of pregnant women, nor did it ‘save any fetus from destruction,’ 
as other methods of abortion remained available in every instance.319 
 
Her concurring opinion mirrors her jurisprudence of the Framers’ intentions regarding 
reproductive rights.  As more rights were given to women, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, the 
Framers of the Constitution, intending to stress that precedent should not allow moral concerns 
to override a woman’s fundamental right to have autonomy over her body.320   
b. Religion And Access To Contraceptives 
One of Justice Ginsburg’s most famous and recent dissenting opinions was decided this 
summer.  It is no surprise that the decision addressed the exercise of the freedom of religion and 
the use of contraceptives regarding insurance policies provided by employers.  The landmark 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.321 case specifically permitted for-profit closely held 
corporations to be exempt from certain laws that the founders and owners of the corporations 
religiously objected to if there is a less restrictive means of furthering the law’s interest.  The 5-4 
decision delivered by the conservative majority struck down the contraceptive mandate 
formulated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) under the 
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Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),322 which requires employers to cover certain methods of 
contraceptives for their female employees.  Although the regulations initially denied exempt 
“religious employers”323 from complying with the contraceptives mandate of this regulation, the 
Obama Administration eventually altered the set of accommodations for certain “religious 
employers.”324  Moreover, “In addition to the exemption for ‘religious employers,’ the 
regulations provided that certain religious nonprofits that certified that they qualified for the 
exemption and objected to some or all of the covered contraceptive services could avoid direct 
coverage of those services, which would be provided by the insurers.”325 On the contrary 
however, “[f]or-profit corporations were ineligible for religious accommodations.”326 
 The contraception mandate was challenged by plaintiffs: Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood 
Specialties, and Mardel as were all closely held corporation companies, whose statement of 
purpose was that they were to be businesses that operated in a manner that reflects Biblical 
principles.327  The companies therefore refuse to facilitate or engage in any behavior that they 
deem inconsistent with their religious beliefs, and they specifically believe that being required to 
facilitate the access to certain contraceptive methods violates their religious beliefs.328  The three 
companies eventually brought suit against the HHS and other federal agencies to challenge the 
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mandate to provide contraceptives under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.329 
 As required by law, under RFRA the Government is prohibited from, 
Substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability unless the Government demonstrates that 
application of burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.330 
 
The first question that the majority addressed was whether this provision regulated for-profit 
corporations,331 thus deciding whether the corporations are allowed to assert claims under the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.332   In holding that corporations were “persons” 
under the RFRA and thus entitled to raise claims, the Court reasoned that RFRA included 
corporations in their definitions of “persons” which includes shareholders, the officers, and the 
employees who are all associated with the corporation.333  Additionally, the Court drew on 
references from the Fourth Amendment and the Dictionary Act to reason that RFRA included 
corporations in its definitions of “persons” because the purpose is to protect the rights of the 
individuals who own and control the corporations.334  Furthermore, the Court asserted that the 
RFRA “was designed to provide very broad protection for religious liberty,”335 and should be 
read with the same flexibility and with the purpose in mind.  And lastly, although the 
corporations may be collectively paying the penalty, it is the “the humans who own and control 
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those companies,”336 who actually “feel the sting of the religious burden,”337 and thus therefore 
constitute “persons” under the RFRA. 
 Next, the Court concluded that the penalties for the corporations for failing to cover the 
disagreeable contraceptive methods and the like were sufficient to constitute a substantial 
burden.338  Although the Court did not question the sincerity of the plaintiff-corporation owner’s, 
the Court did however agree that the minimum coverage mandate conflicted with religious 
beliefs in that, “the provision of coverage entailed wrongful cooperation with a grave moral 
evil.”339  In holding that the plaintiffs established a substantial burden if they were required to 
comply with the mandate, the Court next addresses whether HHS has shown that the mandate 
was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and whether it was the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.340  In response, the Court “assume[s] 
that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is 
compelling within the meaning of RFRA.”341  Furthermore, the Court finds that HHS has failed 
its burden in showing that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a 
substantial burden on the exercise of their freedom of religion.342 
 In her four-member minority, Justice Ginsburg scorns the majority for a “decision of 
startling breadth,” that was too eager to unfairly require the public to bear the costs of those 
religious exemptions for for-profit corporations.343  Conclusively, Justice Ginsburg charges the 
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Court with applying RFRA in such a way that departs from rather than reinstates pre-Smith, and 
in doing so, the majority decision is incorrect because as a result, “the Court falters at each step 
of its analysis.”344  In terms of the Court’s holding that the term “persons” under the RFRA 
encompasses a for-profit corporation, Justice Ginsburg asserts that it does not.  Not only is there 
no case law to support the majority’s conclusion, but “[u]ntil this litigation, no decision of this 
Court recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a 
generally applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.”345  In her powerful 
dissent, the lack of precedent clearly suggests that the Free Exercise Clause is indicative of 
“natural persons, and not artificial entities.”346  However, Justice Ginsburg does agree that, 
[s]ome ‘artificial legal entities’ should be protected, because ‘[r]eligious organizations exist to 
foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith,’ but the line should be 
drawn for ‘for-profit corporations.’”347 
 Overwhelmingly, Justice Ginsburg’s exposed the faults in the majority’s opinion and 
shed light on the detrimental effect that the ruling would have on women, as they represent a 
significant factor in her “equal citizen stature” jurisprudence.  In her assertive dissent, she 
explains that the plaintiff corporations failed to show a substantial burden, because of the 
“attenuation between any religious claims by the corporate owners and the independent 
contraceptive choices of their employees.”348  Not only did Justice Ginsburg find the 
government’s interest of “public health and women’s well being”349 clearly compelling, but she 
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emphasized that any decision that the female makes pertaining to the use of contraceptives is her 
autonomous choice under her physician’s advice, which is outside of the scope and interest of 
her employer.  In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the majority’s decision disproportionately harmed 
women and put them at risk, which cuts against the notion that there is, “[n]o tradition, and no 
prior decision under RFRA, [that] allows a religion-based exemption when the accommodation 
would be harmful to others.”350 
III. CONCLUSION 
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence of ensuring the Framers’ intention that ALL individuals are 
including in “We the People” continues to bring about slow, yet incremental change as a means 
for actively perfecting the more perfect union.  Her opinions either hone in on the flexible 
interpretation of the living Constitution when writing for the majority, or it powerfully disagrees 
with the majority when it denies equal protection for citizens.  Moreover, all that she has seen, all 
that she has heard, and all that she has endured in her life, sensitizes her drive for equality.  Her 
passion began with her mother and the sad regret that her mother never lived to see the day 
where Ruth became that individual woman that she instilled in her to be.  And her drive for 
equality although it is far from over, ends when there is no longer a demand for the service of 
equality. 
In every respect Justice Ginsburg is a lioness, both in the battlefield of the courtroom and in 
the battlefield of life.  As a lioness she can be graceful in that she can deeply sympathize with 
discrimination, and she does have a defensive side where she can attack the majority for their 
lack of understanding and intelligence when it comes to attacking the principles that put the 
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Framers’ intent of equality in jeopardy.  Furthermore, as with any lioness, Justice Ginsburg is 
deemed an activist judge who charges Congress with the task of correcting flawed decisions of 
the majority.  Her decisions reflect its flexibility for the future instead of limiting its applicability 
to today.  She is brave, she stands alone in her dissents if need be, and she reflects how important 
her position is on the Court although she doesn’t let the esteem of her job title limit her ability to 
identify with issues occurring off of the bench.  In essence, she leads…in her opinions, in her 
dissents, in her early life, in her academic success, and in her hobbies, not follows.  She is a 
lioness and she is liberal. 
